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Purpose -- The fundamental purpose of this study is to analyze
and evaluate the basic tenets of the New Conservatism in America. Dur¬
ing the past seventeen years America has found herself perplexed by
the onslaught of tremendous intellectual energies being expounded in a
relatively new field of endeavor -- New Conservatism, During its short
life span it has acquired two intellectually inspired journals (Modern Age
and National Review). Our libreiries are witnessing an ever-increasing
bibliography on the subject. Our college campuses are also bearing wit¬
ness to an ever-increasing number of students, as well as professors,
who are openly proclaiming themselves, or being proclaimed, conserva¬
tives, This "sudden burst of energy" on the intellectual level makes
doubly important a serious inquiry into its substance.
Results. — New Conservatism, during its very short life span.
has played a significant role in the reincarnation and rejuvenation of the
conservative spirit which has been an integral, though subsidiary, part
of our country's development. In the absence of a crown and nobility,
as witnessed by Europe, the New Conservative has placed renown interest
in the institution of private property and the welfare of the individual.
In this, as other developing schools of thought, dissension has
developed among its ranks. Out of this dissension has evolved several
opposing factions with differing and varying guiding principles. These
principles, as well as the concurring ones, will serve as the focal
point of this study.
The growth of New Conservatism in America has necessitated
a bit of "soTol searching" on the part of its proponents as a means of
finding some sustaining force within which it might imbue itself with
a sense of morality sind a sense of history. This search has wan¬
dered back into the annals of United States history and across the sea
and into the realms of European history. Several champions of the
New Conservative doctrine have emerged. Foremost among these
stands Edmund Burke. Is this a justifiable choice? If not, where
can the New Conservative turn for a philosophy of American conser¬
vatism, a philosophy of tradition, order, and preservation that is rele¬
vant to the problems - personal as well as social - of an industrial,
democratic, progressive society? Does such a philosophy exist?
Is such a philosophy possible? These, among other questions, will
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Purpose of Study. — The fundamental purpose of this study is to
analyze and evaluate the basic tenets of the New Conservatism in America,
During the past seventeen years America has found herself perplexed by
the onslaught of tremendous intellectual energies being expounded in a
relatively new field of endeavor — New Conservatism, During its short
life span it has acquired two intellectually inspired journals (Modern Age
and National Review), Our libraries are witnessing an ever-increasing
bibliography on the subject. Our college campuses are also bearing wit¬
ness to an ever- increasing number of students, as well as professors, who
are openly proclaiming themselves, or being proclaimed. New Conserva¬
tives, This "sudden burst of energy" on the intellectual level makes doubly
important a serious inquiry into its substance.
Scope and Limitation, --^Because of the prolific nvimber of
writings which have emanated from the pens of many self-proclaimed
"New Conservatives" during the past seventeen years, and the vast interests
considered in these writings, the author of this study has sensed the neces¬
sity of limiting it predominantly to three writers. While the selection of
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these "three writers" necessarily involves sonae arbitrary judgment,
the literature on New Conservatism seems rather clearly to indicate
that these men are the leading spokesmen, among many others of les¬
ser magnitude: Russell Kirk, Peter Viereck and Willmoore Kendall,
Primary justification for the selection of these writers rest in the
extent to which each of them has seriously, systematically, and can¬
didly presented the case for a revival of conservative thought. A
great deal of what has been written on New Conservatism has been
written by these men or has been written by others who widely ac¬
knowledge the intellectual leadership of Kirk, Viereck, and/or
Kendall in the New Conservative "movement".
The present study is not concerned with conservatism as
a series of political party principles. It is not an epithet, nor a tool
for the eulogist or for the polemist. Realizing the versatility of the
term, the writer is inclined to insist, rather arbitrarily, that "con¬
servatism" be considered here as a rather unique type of "ideology".
Perhaps it may be considered an ideology because it represents a
system of ideas concerned with the distribution of political and social
vsilues. It is unique because it cannot stand alone as a self-contained
system of normative or substantive goals and preferences, butr, always
I
stands in "symbiotic" relationship to the national system of substan-
5
tive ideals which it seeks to fulfill and conserve.
Methods of Research. -- This study is a fusion of three
methodologies of research; historical, descriptive, and analytical.
Procedure of Inquiry. — In launching an analysis of New
Conservatism one of the most important initial observations one could
make is that the phrase implies a degree of unanimity or cohesiveness
among its proponents which simply does not exist. Therefore, the
author faces the triple task, in chapter two, of describing what New
Conservatism is, what New Conservatives think New Conservatism is,
and what critics of New Conservatism think it is.
Chapter three exposes the foundations upon which the basic
philosophy of New Conservatism has been built. The three basic pil¬
lars of this philosophy, which will be shown in vivid detail, are the
political, if it might be referred to as such, social, and economic doc¬
trines of the Honorable Edmund Burke.
Chapter four is an analysis of the conservative philosophies of
Russell Kirk, Peter Viereck, and Willmoore Kendall. An earnest and
sympathetic attempt is made on the part of the author, to present the
philosophies of these writers. A critical analysis which shows con¬
siderable deviations from the foundations exposed by Edmund Burke
6
will be presented at the end of this chapter.
Chapter five presents the various dissenting elements which
are seen in the writings of the New Conservatives. Among the cate¬
gories considered will be the New Conservatives' thoughts on tradi¬
tion and order, religion, civil liberties, and the state. This chapter
will perhaps pave the way towards a fuller and more direct appraisal
of New Conservatism in terms of analytical structure.
Chapter six presents a general summary and conclusion of
the findings of this study.
Sources of Materials and Tools of Research. -- Materials used
in this study were obtained from the following sources: Trevor Arnett
Library (Atlanta University, Atlanta, Georgia), Atlanta Public Library
(Atlanta, Georgia), Library of Congress (Washington, D, C,), Library
of the Industrial College of the Armed Forces (Washington, D, C,),
and the National War College Library (Washington, D. C. ). The
various tools utilized in the above sources were microfilms, books,
periodicals, newspapers, and pamphlets.
Significance of Study. — This study would be of minor signifi¬
cance to the reader desiring a thorough knowledge of the subject. But,
it should be of major significance to one seeking an analytical com¬
pendium of the New Conservatism in America,
Chapter II
New Conservatism; The Problem of Definitions
The last seventeen years witnessed the development of the New
Conservatism in America. It is now experiencing wide currency.
Almost everywhere that one might cast an eye — in the daily papers,
the journals of opinion, the bookman’s window, or the school li¬
braries — men are seen writing of New Conservatism. The student of
the American political mind finds a particular appeal in the New
Conservatism, since the swelling bibliography clearly indicates a
renewed activity in American political thought. Writers of many
species and persuasions refer to the “revival, " the “recrudescence, “
the “return to respectability, “ of conservatism in America, Having
discerned life, perchance even strife, in an area singularly defi¬
cient in doctrinaire cleavages, the student whets his scalpel and pro¬
ceeds to the task of revealing the sources, the nature, the purposes,
and the meaning of the New Conservatism in America.
Few words in our political vocabulary have been subjected
to more confused and contradictory use than conservatism. Before
delving into the actual content of this contradictory term let us first
accede to the fact that it does not possess an universally accept¬
able definition. Therefore, we must not delude ourselves by pre-
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tending that it can be defined easily or along conventional lines. As
long ago as 500 B.C., the philosopher Confucius pointed out the im¬
portance of precise language in a nation's life by stating:
If language is not correct, then what
is said is not what is meant; if what is said
is not meant, then what ought to be done
remains undone, morals and art will deter¬
iorate; if morals and art deteriorate, jus¬
tice will go astray; if justice goes astray,
the people will stand about in helpless con¬
fusion. ^
The full extent of the confusion or disagreement that persists in the
meaning of the term will be later illustrated through citing some of
Ihe varying definitions that have been attempted by various political
commentators.
The first obstacle that must be noticed by anyone vto at¬
tempts to arrive at a definition of the word conservatism is that it
has two separate and independent tendencies of meaning associated
2
with it. The "fact" that they are only accidentally associated with
each other — that one cannot be deduced from the other, they
can conflict -- is at the heart of the confusion in its use. The first
tendency of meaning is presented in Webster's Dictionary; "eon-
^tated in "What Is An Extremist?" Look, October 28,
1964, p. 34.
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Philip C. Chapman, "The New Conservatism, " Poli¬
tical Science Quarterly, LXXV (March, 1960), p. 27
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servative" is defined as "conserving; preservation," and "conserva¬
tism" as "the disposition and tendency to preserve what is estab-
lished; opposition to change. " Derived from the verb "to con¬
serve, " this meaning forms the basis or is recognized in some
degree by almost everyone who usee the word in everyday speech.
The second tendency associates the word conservatism
with a nimiber of specific commitments about the best forms of
society and government. These commitments presuppose the ideo¬
logical elements involved in the concept; therefore, they cannot be
defined properly. Very often, commentators have picked out one
or the other of these tendencies and identified it as "true conser¬
vatism, " or the "essential" part of conservatism, and have ex¬
pelled the other uses of the word from the pale of their appro¬
val. This has been of little help, however, because no consen¬
sus has developed as to which of the tendencies should be ex¬
cluded — as to whether conservatism should mean the desire to
conserve the established as such, or a commitment to a par-
4
ticular set of social values. Later in the paper we will dis¬
cover that it means both.
^Webster's New World Dictionary (Cleveland and New
York, 1964), p. 312.
^Chapman, op. cit., p. 28.
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Perhaps, in order to better comprehend what should or
should not be referred to as conservatism, it is necessary to un¬
derstand how these different connotations of the word came into
being. We will take a brief look, therefore, at the historical set¬
ting in which the word was born.
According to Mannheim, "It was Chateaubriand who first
lent the word its peculiar meaning when he called the periodical
he issued to propagate the ideas of the clerical and political res¬
toration, The Conservative."^ Whatever Chateaubriand intended the
word to mean, it was rapidly taken over by every group which had
opposed the progress of the French Revolution.
As a distinct political term conservatism is said to be 133
years old, coming into general usuage after the Great Reform Act
of 1832 in Great Britain. At that time the word meant "oppo¬
sition to reform."® In Europe, conservative parties generally
stood for loyalty to the monarchy, for king and country, and the tra¬
ditional, natural way of doing things. In America, the colonial con¬
servatives were likely to be loyalists, followers of the Crown, Tories,
®Cited in Karl Mannheim, Essays on Sociology and Social
Psychology (London, 1953), p, 216.
r>
°Jasper B. Shannon, "Conservatism," Annals of the Amer¬
ican Academy of Political and Social Sciences, CCCXLIV (Novem¬
ber, 1962), p. 214.
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in the language of their day. Members of the governor's council
were generally large landowners, frequently seeking larger grants.
They were likely to be officials in the accepted clerical hierachy in
the established church of the dominant denomination, and, not infre¬
quently, they were officers in the colonial militia. The American
Natiosaal Republicans, Whigs, were calling themselves "conserva¬
tives" by 1830, and the term was adopted as the name of the Bri¬
tish Tory Party of 1832.
There were vast differences between the theories of British
Tories and Continental Conservatives. And, of course, there were
O
communications and many similarities between them. This is seen
quite vividl3j;_;;in the writings of the New American Conservatives. With
the major exception of Peter Viereck, they draw much of their in¬
spiration from British conservatism. Yet, they are unable to coun¬
sel us as to how the unique historical experience of Britain fits the
American scene, and how it can be copied her©;. This is particu¬
larly true of that curious compound of religious as well as economic
and social interests and background of the conservative party which
is so peculiarly British, and at the same time, is so virulently
7 8
Ibid., p. 15. Ibid., p. 16.
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unappreciated by many of the American interpreters of British
politics, as is pointed out by Leslie Lipson:
Since the country squires were mostly Anglican,
while the leaders of commerce were largely non¬
conformist, the religious split complimented the
economic - a fact that contributed materially to a
two-party system. Thus founded and fortified, the
system had more than a century in which to settle
down before encountering its severest test - the im¬
pact of rapid technological changes on the economic
and social order,®
The contest between manufe-cturers and farmers "amoun¬
ted to a vertical division in the British economy," whereby in¬
dustrial wealth and liberal forces became arrayed against landed
wealth and conservative power. As the liberal party weakened and
as tariff-conscious manufacturers drifted into the conservative
camp, labor, at first divided between conservatives and liberals,
gave birth to a separate party.
Writing along similar lines, McKitrick has this to say con¬
cerning the development and relationship of American and European
conservative thought:
Conservatism as a mode of thought respectable
enough to justify formal philosophical expression
has never in the past had Isrery organic connec¬
tions with the problems of this country and this
culture. With Europe it has been different: the
thoughts of Burke, Maistre, Metternich, New-
mann and the rest were real enough responses
to stresses that arose 'there,' and as such they
remain instructive enough for us or for anyone
g
Leslie Lipson, "The Two-Party System in British Politics, "






interested in the rich European past. But then to try
making parallels with American experience is really
straining the connection much too far, especially
when it comes to placing men like John Calhoun,
John Randolph, Alexander Haimilton, and John
Adams in the same tradition, one in which they
have very little business. For the parallels between
American political and cultural development and those
of Europe.,. are infinitely less instru|:|ive than are
the profound and dramatic contrasts.
Perhaps no proof needs to be presented that "the rich European past"
has no parallel in American religious or party history. Consequently,
the close integration of British conservative thought with the ideas
of some of our New American Conservative writers, the latter of
which quote generously from Edmund Burke, hardly has any ana¬
logy in American politics. According to Ludwig Freund, "the theo-
13
rizing 'new conservatives' are virtually 'air-borne' in this country."
I n view of these observations, one is led to query: "What,
then, is New Conservatism?" In order to try and arrive at an an¬
swer to this question the writer will begin by noting briefly four or even
five distinct senses in which the words conservatism and conservative
are used in current discussion. When an individual describes himself
as a conservative, he probably means to express one of these thoughts:
(1) That his temper is conservative, that he has a basic aver¬
sion to changes in his mode of living. The overriding traits in this con-
12
Quoted in Eric L. McKitrick, "Conservatism Today, "
American Scholar, XXVII (Winter, 1957-58), pp. 51-52.
13
Ludwig Freund, 'iThe New American Conservatism and
European Conservatism, " Ethics, LXVI (October, 1955), p. 12.
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servative temperament would probably be habit, inertia, fear, and
emulation, all of which move men to seek security and peace with
every irrational fiber in their beings. These traits, being of a
relative nature, may appear as dominant or recessive features
of ones character.
(2) That his tastes are conservative, that his judgments
and decisions in the areas of work, play, culture, religions, and
social relations are cautious, moderate, and sometimes predic¬
table. Such an individual has something substantial to defend against
change, whether it be his status, reputation, power, or most com¬
monly, property. For some individuals the ownership of property
may become so powerful a force in their daily lives that their con¬
servatism of taste is transformed into a conservatism of posses¬
sion. In any case the equilibrium for such individuals depends
largely on what they have and hold; threats to their property or sta-
15
tus are threats to their interests, routine, and comfort.
(3) That his politics are conservative, he can be counted on
to take a stand on current issues in opposition to those individuals
who experiment with or alter the established order. This man has
looked beyond his own comings and goings and has recognized, how¬
ever fuzzily, that he is a member of a community worth defending
14,
See Clinton Rossiter, "The New Conservatives, " Harper’s




against reform and revolution. He recognizes further that such
defense calls for something more than holding his own place and
property, and he is ready to support men and movements dedi¬
cated to preserving his country's "way of life" - as he understands
16
it.
(4) That his mind is conservative, that he subscribes con¬
sciously to principles designed to guard the established order against
careless tinkering or determined reform. This individual has a
general understanding of the history, structure, ideals, and traditions,
of his society; the real tendencies and implications of proposals
of reform; and the importance of conservatism in maintaining a
stable social order. He is aware that he is a conservative, and
that he must therefore think conservative thoughts as well as prac¬
tice conservative politics. This variety of conservative is of a
very rare nature. In a later part of this study the writer attempts
to identify four other tenets which might be consKiered in this
connection.
The conservatisms of tempef", taste and possession have
always flourished in America, as in many other societies. Few
will object to a man's calling himself a conservative in these three
senses, unless, of course, he is one who delights in unorthodojQ^.
16 17
Ibid., p. 76. See pages 17-18.
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Having been bewildered by the tremendous growth and expansion of
New Conservatism in this country, especially in the area of philo¬
sophy, the writer will concentrate the preponderance of his energies
on an analysis of this particular aspect.
Even in the attempt to limit ourselves to this seemingly nar¬
row "field" of the concept, certain difficulties are apt to arise.
(1) Since in any grouping or activity different persons may resist
different changes and innovations, or resist change and inno¬
vation because of attachment to different aspects of the heritage
from the past, we must not be surprised to find more than one par¬
ticular connotation of conservatism in one and the same grouping or
activity. In view of this we are able, therefore, to see why the term
conservative is used with frequency, and other than univo-
cally, in everyday discourse. Moreover, we should note that, as
the terms can be legitimately used to describe resistance to change
in any grouping, it often refers to controversies that have little sig-
18
nificance for the entire society.
(2) In that change does occur in our society -- even though the
resisters appear to have their way at times -- the heritage from the
past begins to take on or include elements which are merely heri¬
tage from the immediate or recent past; thereby abetting further
18
Willmoore Kendall and George W. Carey, "Towards a
Definition of Conservatism, " Journal of Politics. XXVff (May,
1964), pp. 408-11.
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reasons for the multiplication of connotations of conservatism in
any one grouping. Some individuals in this group will accept the
newly admitted elements, and proceed to resist any attempt to
alter them in the name of further progress; others may refuse to
accept them and demand that they be eliminated altogether. Both
contentions are clearly of a conservative nature, but with the hither¬
to unnoticed complication that some of our "conservatives" now
differ with "progressives" not as to whether there shall be change
19
and innovation, but as to the direction it shall take.
(3) Particular conservatisms in this grouping are likely
to multiply over still another set of issues, having to do with the
question whether - and, if so, to what extent - conservatives see
themselves as called upon to develop the "tradition" or "ortho¬
doxy" they have received from their forebears, or, contrariwise,
to hand it down to their descendants without modification or elab¬
oration. Some demonstrably conservative utterances treat tradition
or orthodoxy as if its "goodness" were exclusively a matter of
its "oldness, " as if that which is ancient were good merely because
it is ancient, and as if that which is new, or modern, were bad
merely because it is new. Others tend to emphasize the "good¬




merely attesting to that goodness and recognize, accordingly, an
obligation to "moderately" reform it and cause it to grow. Only
the former, properly speaking, falling under those definitions of
conservatism that equate it with opposition to change and innovation,
often become its most ardent proponents and, as suggested above,
clash with progressives over the direction in which modifications
shall occur and the "principles" that are to govern them. If we
were to attempt a trek upon the dangerous soil of "classification"
of men we could speak of the former group as static conservatives and
the latter one may be characterized as developmental conservatives.
(4) Conservative resistance may, in certain circumstances,
(for example, in a society or organization or activity that at an
earlier moment has passed under more or less complete control
by progressive changers and innovators), express itself in the de¬
sire to overthrow the status quo and in the tradition or orthodoxy to
which it points as its justification. This particular conservative
may regard himself as the defender of a tradition or orthodoxy
which, though it has been reduced to a mere remnant, he con¬
tinues to insist upon as "the" orthodoxy appropriate to that par-
21
ticular organization or activity.






"What role has the New Conservative's philosophy in America
today? Is the New Conservatism really of a conservative nature?"
According to Professor Huntington, of Harvard University,
"Mueh of the New Conservatism is characterized by at least three
22
deficiencies as a conservative movement. " The first of these is
marked in the uncertainty on the part of many New Conservatives
23
as to "what they wish to defend." Some simply continue the old
identification of conservatism with business liberalism. Desiring
to import eighteenth century European aristocracy into twentieth
century America, they dream of an age of less democracy, less
equality, less industrialism; in other words, an age in which the
elite would rule and the masses would not only know their places
but be happy and content therein.
The second of these deficiences, as seen by Professor
Huntington, is marked in many New Conservatives being "aston-
ingly vague as to the nature and source of the threat to what they
24
wish to conserve. " Historically, conservatism has basically
been the responsex to a direct and immediate challenge. Conser¬
vatives have not usually been in doubt as to the identity of their
opponents. But, according to Hxmtington:
Quoted in Samuel P. Hxmtington, Conservatism As An





Among the New Conservatives.. .the enemy
is seldom brought clearly into focus. To some,
the foe is Liberalism.... To others, it is mod¬
ernism, totalitarianism, popularism. For some
New Conservatives the enemy is irrationalism
and to others it is rationalism.^^
"A third deficiency of the New Conservatism, " Huntington
continues, "is the effort to uncover a conservative intellectual tra-
26
dition in America. " Apparently desiring the security of iden¬
tification with an intellectual movement, the New Conservatives
search through America's past, resurrecting political and intel¬
lectual figures long since forgotten. This search on the part of the
New Conservatives merely reflects their own uncertainty of pur¬
pose, role, and identity. They seek, in some instances , to con¬
serve an intellectual tradition which does not exist rather than in¬
stitutions which do exist. "Were they true conservatives,"
Huntington avers, "immediately engaged in the defense of an in¬
stitution or society against a real and imminent threat, they would
27
have little interest in establishing a conservative pedigree."
Perhaps the most perplexing problem which has arisen
in connection with the recent revival of interest in conservative
thought is the question of its relevancy to conditions in the United
States today. If we were to make an attempt at finding a fault in the
New Conservative writers we might pursue their constant attempts
26 27Ibid.25lbid., p. 472. Ibid., p. 473.
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to state their positions in the rhetoric of eighteenth-century Eng¬
land. Futhermore, we might conclude that their proposals have
frequently been too vague to convey their meanings adequately.
In that long discussions on the "goodness" of an aristo¬
cratic society are basically of no interest to Americans whose cul¬
ture is void of such, it should not be surprising when critics ques¬
tion how applicable philosophical conservatism can be toward sol¬
ving the controversial problems confronting a relatively new
country like the United States where aristocratic values seem to
be largely a part of the long-vanished past. In fact, the critics
of conservatism have centered their attacks on the conservatives'
interpretations of traditions and their aristocratic social philosophy.
Have the New Conservatives attempted to invent a tradi¬
tion which has never existed? Has our Americaniheritage been
shot through and through with a conservative tradition just wait¬
ing to be discovered? Certainly a tradition cannot be invented.
And according to some authors, it is highly unlikely that a conser-
2 8
vative tradition will be "discovered" in America.
28For a further analysis of this proposition see Louis
Hartz, The Liberal Tradition In America (New York, 1955), ch.
Ilj John Hallowell, The Moral Foundation Of Democracy (Chicago,
1954), pp. 4-19; and Raymond English, "Conservatism And The
State, " Virginia Quarterly Review, XXXII (November, 1956),
pp. 50-65.
22
In spite of this, the New Conservatives of America have set out on
a quest for a tradition which will serve as a model for conservatism.
This quest has taken our New Conservatives outside the shores of
our country and indeed right into the hands of their critics. Their
journey has, however, been limited, for the most part, to Great
Britain,
A brief summary of political thought shows a great many
men, from various countries, with well-founded ideas of a conser¬
vative nature. In view of this fact one ponders: "Why Britain? ”
Having been fascinated by the writings of Edmund Burke, certain
American conservatives have been led to conceive of Britain as the
conservative state "par excellence".
What was there about this Englishman named Burke which
led American conservatives to quote him endlessly? What was there
about his nature which led Macauley to describe him as, "the grea-
29
test man since Milton." What was there about his writing which
has enabled him to assume a position among the "immortals" of his¬
tory? Why has he become the "god" of the New Conservatives? In
an attempt to answer these, among many other questions, the wri¬
ter will pursue a critical inquiry into his basic political, social, and
economic philosophies in the following chapter.
29
See Thomas Macauley, The Story of England from the
Accession of James II (New York, n. d.), p. iii.
Chapter III
Edmund Burke; Main Source of "New Conservatism"
From the foregoing analysis it is clear that we need some
reference point in assessing the nature and incidence of conserva¬
tism in America and England. That is, even though we confine
ourselves to the general area of "philosophical" conservatism,
there are even here several interpretations, each with its own
orthodoxy or tradition that it seeks to preserve or advance. Con¬
sequently, our assessment of conservatism in these countries will
vary, depending upon which particular conservatism we fix our
attention upon. We propose to take as refersat the conservatism
of Edmund Burke since he is, by fairly common consent, the
"father" of modern conservatism.
Before entering upon a systematic analysis of this "in¬
tellectual giant," two prefatory remarks must be made. First of
all, Burke did not leave any comprehensive, generalized works.
Most of his writings were dirfested to the particular political pro¬
blems with which he was concerned (with two important early
exceptions which we will discuss). Nevertheless his books and let¬
ters contain a great number of generalizations about ethical and
societal problems. The approach to Burke's theories must be
focused on these generalizations and on the relation between them
23
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and the positions he took in concrete situations.
Secondly, no one claims that Burke was a "pure" conser¬
vative by any of the definitions given. Many commentators agree that
he accepted elements of Liberalism and change, though his conser¬
vatism remained paramount -- as we shall see in this chapter. We
shall be concerned, however, solely with the nature of his conser¬
vatism; though it is important to remember that this was not the
only value base in his theories. With these reservations we may now
turn to consider the nature of Burke's conservatism.
When Edmund Burke tried to influence British policy with
regard to the American colonies, he refused to justify his own
distinctions of right, asserting that of such distinctions he hated
the very sound. ^ He referred instead to the happiness of the Amer¬
ican people before the changes in the old colonial policy had been
introduced. He stated, "These are the arguments of states and
kingdoms. Leave the rest to the schools; there, only can they be
discussed with safety. In this particular case, it was tradi¬
tional policy, Burke thought, that had made for human happiness
^Edmund Burke, "Speech on American Taxation, " The
Works of Edmund Burke (Boston, 1866), II, p. 73. All Subsequent
citations of Burke's writings refer to this edition of the collected
works, unless otherwise indicated.
■ I ^Ibid., p. 75.
25
and a more recent policy that had led to oppression. This distinc¬
tion, between the argviments of states and kingdoms and the argu¬
ment of schools, runs throughout his speeches and letters. If we
consider the two kinds of argument together, qnite apart from the
immediate colonial problems discussed in the speech on Ameri¬
can taxation, we may be able to perceive a basic element of
Burke's political philosophy.
While Burke said on one occasion that he never attacked
"theory as such" but only "weak, erroneous, fallacious, unfin¬
ished, or imperfect theory," it is nevertheless true that he made
implicit distinctions between theory and practice. ^ He stressed
their different roles, and therefore their different methods and
requirements.
MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
Many recent writers, proclaiming Burke as a conservative,
have laid tremendous stress upon the historical element in his poli?
tical philosophy.'^ They have emphasized the importance of Burke's
^See Burke, "Speech on a Motion for a Committee to In¬
quire Into the State of Representation of the Commons in Parlia¬
ment, " VII, p. 97.
'^See Robert Bisset. The Life Of Edmund Burke (London,
1913), p. 19; also see John MacCunn, The Political Philosophy Of
Burke (London, 1916), p. 193; and George Sabine, A History Of
Political Theory (New York, 1961), pp. 607-14.
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appeals to social traditions and manners, to legal prescription and
laws, to his passion for liberty connected with civil order and legal
justice, to his veneration of "the wisdom of our ancestors," as em¬
bodied in church and state, to his defense of the constitutional
safeguards to life, liberty and property, to his praise of "pre¬
judice" and duty as against abstract reason and rights, and to
his conception of man as a civil or political animal, who finds his
self-fulfillment in the "gradually unfolding corporate life of his
nation. By taking into account many of the most important as¬
pects of civil society, as discussed by Burke, this view of his
political philosophy has illuminated many of the most vital prin¬
ciples in his complex thought. In spite of these views, the wri¬
ter feels that the ultimate basis of Burke's political conservatism,
if it might be referred to as such, is not to be found in history,
solely, but in his moral principles as well.
In order to better understand the basis of Burke's
"political philosophy" his religious and ethical principles should
be analyzed in conjunction with it. Prior to doing this it is
necessary to understand in what sense "history is a preceptor
of prudence, " and why it was that Burke considered prudence to
Sibid.
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be "in all things a virtue, in politics, the first of virtues.
For Burke, political philosophy was the practical art
of governing man as a moral agent in civil society. The politi¬
cian, by Burke's definition, was "the philosopher in action," and
he could never assume a priori knowledge that would enable him
to attain exact mathematical certainty in the consequences of his
decisions."^ Politics he considered a part of practical reason,
not theoretical reason; it was concerned with the good, not the
true. He writes:
The nature and actions of men are under
general laws of moral necessity, but because
the will of man is free to obey or defy the moral
law, and because his social circumstances are
infinitely varied, contingent matters and details
there can be no general laws. ... The progres¬
sive sagacity that keeps company with times and
occasions and decides upon things in their exist¬
ing position, is that alone which can give true pro¬
priety, grace, and effect to a man's conduct.
It is very hard to anticipate the occasion and to
live by a rule more general.^
To Burke, "no moral questions are ever abstract questions."^
Prudence was for Burke not an intellectual, but a moral virtue and
as it was a corrective and the best positive alternative to the
errors of metaphysical abstraction:
^Burke, "Reflections On The Revolution In France," III, p. 345.
"^See Peter J. Stanlis, "The Basis Of Burke's Poliitcal Con¬
servatism, " Modern Age, V (Summer, 1961), p. 265.
%bid., p. 456. Qlbid., p. 457.
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Nothing universal can be rationally affirmed
on any moral or political subject. Pure meta¬
physical abstractions does belong to these na tters.
The lines of morality are not like ideal lines of
mathematics. They are broad and deep as well
as long. They admit of exceptions; that demand
modifications. These exceptions and modifications
are not made by the rules of prudence. Prudence
is not only the first in rank of the virtues poli¬
tical and moral, but she is the director, the reg¬
ulator, the standard of them all,
Burke maintained that "the exercise of competent jurisdic¬
tion is a manner of moral prudence, " because "moral necessity is
not like metaphysical, or even physical, " Tyranny was a more
common abuse in government than usurpation, Burke felt, be¬
cause even under legitimate legislatures, "if the rules of be¬
nignity and prudence are not observed oppressive actions may
result, Commenting upon the role of prudence in the politi¬
cal arena Peter J. Stanlis states:
Prudence, or a strict regard for circumstances,
is not merely a matter of empirical observation and
intellectual calculations; it is morally imperative
to regard circumstances, because otherwise political
action could mortally injure those whom the statesman
wishes to serve,
^^Burke, "Speech On ConciliationWith The Colonies In
America, " II, p, 170,
^^Burke, "Thoughts On The Causes Of The Present Discon¬
tents, " I, p, 440,
12
Stanlis, op, cit,, p, 266.
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To Burke, prudence was part of God's "divine tactic"
fulfilled in man's moral temperance and political tact. Understood
in this profoundly Aristotelian sense, Burke's principle of pru¬
dence is nothing less than the universal, eternal and unchangeable
"natural law" applied in practice through politics to each particu¬
lar man, at every moment and in all circumstances, under the
constitutional sovereignty of various nations. Since "the situ¬
ation of man is the preceptor of his duty," prudence tells us when
we should "abate our demands in favor of moderation and justice,
and tenderness to individuals. Prudence is not calculation, but
the moral discretion which enables men to live by the spirit of
iil4
the moral law.
NATURE OF THE STATE
For Burke, as for Plato, the original foundation of the
\
community, in the "state of nature," is the "natural affection" of
its members for each other, growing out of the familistic origin
of the society. The affection of the individuals is not only for
^^See Burke, "Conciliation," II, p. 104,
^'^Ibid., p. 170.
l^Edmund Burke, "Reflections On The Revolution In
France, " The Writings and Speeches of Edmund Burke (London,
n. d.), III, pp. 333-39.
i
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each other but also is directed to the "love and veneration of the
whole. " The reason why tradition is such an important element
in the unity of the community is that it takes time to cement a
"union of minds" and to build "contending principles into a con-
„16
sistent whole. This helps make clear what his basic atti¬
tude was towards tradition. Its basic purpose was to build harmony
out of societal conflicts. It was this harmony which he saw in
medieval tradition (which we will analyze later in this study) and
it was for this reason that he could not support tradition when
it lost the capacity to harmonize. But when harmony becomes
embodied in tradition its purpose is reenforced because of the
tendency of repeated usage itself to promote tranquility. Tra¬
dition is thus conceived in a similar perspective to the natural
law. Burke stated, "These links of affection, kinship, and tradition
can be as strong as links of iron." Affection and tradition were
the social and intellectual bases of the community, as the com¬
mon economic interest to which he often referred was the material
base.
The political community was formed by an orjginal
18





Burke, "Natural Society, " Writings, I, p. 11.
Ibid., p. 13
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chain of subordination in which each man must play the part assigned
19
to him by God. The chain consists of the class divisions of society
and each class must have its hereditary privileges protected against
20
the potential conflicts of diverse interests. The most vital class
in the community, according to Burke, is the "natural aristocracy, "
which is the "soul" of the community. The deciding should rest with
this natural leadership because without it this "natural harmony"
and this "beautiful order" becomes a mere collection of "mere vaga¬
bonds. ..21
Majority rule, according to Burke, is not the natural state
of man because it "presupposes an agreement by the political 'cor-
22
poration' of society to accept majority decisions as binding."
The political community must exist before any majority rule agree¬
ment, and it is therefore superior to any claims of political
natural rights. Thus, while the consent of the community to the govern¬
ment decisions is desirable authority will be based on obedience
rather than force. The people may be presvuned to consent
to "whatever benefits them," and actual consent is void if it is con-
19
Burke, "An Appeal from the New to the Old Whigs, "
Writings, IV, p. 165.
20
Burke, "Reflections," Writings, III, p. 292.





trary to the order of God. Similarly, the desires of the people
need not be heeded when they violate the rules of justice. 24 Long
usage and "flourishing conditions" are presumptuous against change,
for tradition indicates the choice of generations of the species which
,,25
is wiser than the individual.
The concept of harmony proves to be the overriding
ingredient which gives substance to his expressions of "justice, "
"the order of God, " "long usuage" and that which "benefits" the
people. It was these "cohesive" elements which he wanted to
conserve above all. The shift from a partial natural rights theory
to the idea of the traditional rights of Englishmen was simply part
of his search for a more dependable way of preventing freedom
from disrupting this supremely important "conservative" com¬
munity. He had little to say about the territorial basis of the
state beyond emphasizing that its subdivisions should be based
on long historical and traditional development.
A tremendous amount of disagreement has seemingly
developed among the ranks of the intellectuals concerning Burke's
views toward the natural law. It would take us too far afield to
analyze the details of this conflict. But, a few points should be
noted. Since it is well known that Burke was an enemy of the
^^Ibid., p. 166.
^^Burke, "Popery," Writings, VI, p. 20.
^^Burke, "Reform, " Writings, II, p. 271.
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revolutionary "rights of man" doctrine, "utilitarian" writers as¬
sumed that Burke rejected the whole tradition of natural law in
favor of expediency, social utility and an appeal to history. Even
George Sabine perpetuated this trend of thought by writing:
Burke made am important contribution to the nine¬
teenth century proposal to replace the system of nat¬
ural law. ... In a sense Burke showed precisely ...
the reaction that was to follow upon Hume's destruc¬
tion of the eternal verities of reason and natural
law. ... It is true that he never denied the reality
of natural rights. ... However, like Hume, he
believed that they were purely conventional....
They arise not from amything belonging to nature
or to the human species at large, but solely from
civil society. ... Accordingly, Burke not only
cleared away, as Hume had done, the pretense
that social institutions depend on reason or nature
but far more than Hume he reversed the scheme
of values implied by the system of natural law. 26
Some recent studies have argued that, far from being an
enemy of natural law, Burke was, in principle and practice, one
of the most eloquent and profound defenders of natural law, mo¬
rality and politics in Western civilization. In 1949, in the pre¬
face of his Burke's Politics, Ross Hoffman took issue with all
previous scholars in the utilitarian tradition by writing;
Burke's politics ... were grounded on recogni¬
tion of the universal natural law of reason and jus¬
tice ordained by God as the foundation of a good com¬
munity. In this recognition the Machiavellian schism
26.
Quoted in George Sabine, A History Of Political Theory
(New York, 1961), p. 608.
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between politics and morali;^ is closed, and it is
exactly in this respect that Burke stands apart from
the modern positivists and pragmatists, who in
claiming him have diminished him. His thought,
to be sure, worked mostly on concrete and-practi-
cal questions and he was not fond of adverting to first
principles of public morality; but affirmation of the
natural law is implicit in all his works, and when
he criticized radically -- when he attacked at the
roots such heinous systems as the anti-Catholic
penal code of Ireland ;and the tyrannical rule of
Hastings in Bengal -- it became explicit.
Professor Hoffman was among the first scholars to state
in print that the foundations of Burke's political philosophy rested
upon the natural law. Since that time nimierous authors have at¬
tempted to prove his thesis to the maximum degree.
"in Burke's politics," according to Stanlis, "prescription
is to law what tradition and custom are to manners, what revelation
is to religion and right is to morality." "The natural law," he con¬
tinues, "is the foundation for Burke's conception of international
and constitutional law, of human nature, of Church and State,
and of his principles of moral prudence, legal prescription and
political sovereignty. As the ethical standard in all human con¬
tract, the Natural Law of God supplied Burke with his convic-
2 8
tion that the greatest and best gift of God to man was government."
27
Quoted in Ross Hoffman, Burke's Politics (New York,
1949), p.xv.
28
St^is, op. cit., p. 273.
35
One of the most recent books on Burke's political philo¬
sophy, Francis Canavan's The Political Reason of Edmund Burke,
states:
There is not to be found in Burke's writing
a formal treatise on the natural law ... but the
doctrine is alluded to throughout his works and
furnishes the premises of his most profound
arguments,
In opposition to those who have contended that Burke's method of
handling political problems proves he was a pragmatist, Canavan's
book shows that Burke's characteristic use of political reason con¬
forms with the self-evMent norms of the natural law.
Another less dissident element of Burke's nature of
the state is reflected in his unpalatable disdain for innova¬
tion, "Example, " he said, in "Thoughts On The Causes Of The Pre-
30
sent Discontent," "is the only argument of effect in civil life,"
To consult "invention" rather than "experience," he said in speaking
of American affairs, "is diametrically of good sense established
among mankind, " He condemned the French Revolution as a
"revolution of innovation, " and his correspondent in Ireland affairs
was urged to "innovate as little as possible upon speculation when
29
Quoted in Francis Canavan, The Political Reason of
Edmund Burke (Durham, N, C,, 1960), p, ii,
30
Cited in Burke, "Present Discontent," Works, I, p, 499,
31
Cited in Burke, "American Taxation, " Works, II, p, 8,
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there is no material inconvenience.
In his "Letter To A Noble Lord," Burke distinguished be¬
tween change and reform. He regarded change as coming from new
and different principles of government, as inventitive, dangerous,
and resulting from a confusion between theory and practice. Re¬
form, on the contrary, was healing and mediatorial. It did not
therefore pass farther out of experience than necessary. ^3
In that experience is an intermittent factor in the New Con¬
servative philosophy, perhaps we should probe more deeply into Burke's
interpretation of it. Burke conceived of "personal experience" as the
34
"best, though not the only schooling for the prudent statesman." He
further recommended "rather a large converse with men and much
35
intercourse in life than deep study of books." He thought of expe¬
rience as a source of political education, and that source was considered
most reliable when it was personal.
Experience and invention were by no means confined
to the political value of cumulative and personal experience. The
inexperienced man was considered by Burke "a danger to political
32
Cited in Burke, "Letter To A Peer Of Ireland, " Works,
IV, p. 237.
33
Cited in Burke, "Letter To A Noble Lord," Works,
IX, p. 358.
34
See Burke, "impeachment Of Warren Hastings, "
Works, IX, p. 357.
^^bid., p. 358.
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life," not only because the most fruitful source of political under¬
standing is not yet open to him, but also because novelty, which
meets with a warm response in men generally and appeals to their
love of adventure, is a grave temptation to the inexperienced.
While all men have this love of adventure, the impact of novel ideas
is more likely to be cushioned in the case of experienced statesmen.
The mind which admires concreteness, finds experience
a strong asset to statesmanship, and fears innovation in politics,
might logically distinguish the conventionality of the statesman from
the refinement of much political thinking. Since political thinking
is designed to answer questions in a more refined manner than
"common sense," some refinement may be presumed virtuous in
theory. "Refined policy, " according to Burke, "causes man to
lose sight of the good objects of government, and causes con-
fusion. " Refinement may even be considered a "refinement in
justice, " which Burke found in the "philosophy of this enlightened
age.
.,38
"Plain good intention," on the other hand, was a reason¬
ably reliable political criterion for Burke. This principle seems
^^See Burke, "Appeal," Works, IV, p. 76.
37
Cited in Burke, "Revolution, " Works, III, p. 417.
38
Cited in Burke, "Present Discontents, " Works,
I, p. 476.
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to introduce a "democratic" element in Burke's thought. He had
great disdain for manipulated opinion, but a profound regard for
plain principles and practices in political life. He thought the comrr
mon people had a special function in understanding those who
implicitly repudiated the notion of the legislative genius. The
reasoning required for free government is of a "coarse texture,"
"rustic," "manly, " and "plain" — these seem to have been
his favorite expressions of description. Burke considered plain-
ness-.not only a political virtue, but the special virtue of the
39
British House of Commons.
THE FEUDAL TRADITION
If we are to consider Burke a "true" Conservative, by any
stretch of the imagination, we come closer to the truth if we adopt
the position that it was specifically the medieval tradition, modi¬
fied by the Whig Revolution, which he was striving to preserve.
When he was trying to find a program of reform for France, as the
alternative to Revolution, he said that "if France could not have
drawn its true traditions from the last generation it should have looked
to an earlier generation for its model. With this tradition as the
model for reform, it could have avoided the catastrophe of the Revo-
39
Burke, 'V^rren Hastings, " Works, XI, p. 170.
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lution. " He further postulates that "if its true traditions were
still not discernible in the earlier generation, then France should
have looked to Britain, which had kept alive the ancient conamon
law of Europe and improved it to its present state. Having
made these recommendations, Burke went on to lament the passing of
the age of chivalry, loyalty to rank, and loyalty to nobility, for
these, he said, "had given modern Europe its distinctive charac-
ter, setting it apart from Asia and classical antiquity. " He
further emphasized lhat "the foundations of European civilization
43
lay in feudal law, manners, classes, religion, and universities."
It was the feudal "spirit of fealty" that freed kings and subjects
from tyranny and set the basis for Europe’s later prosperity.
Contrary to Huntington's interpretation, he also made it clear
that his loyalty was to the medievsil tradition first and to modern
commercial capitalism only secondly, for he claimed that commerce
was only the effect of the spirit of feudalism, and that "nobility"
45
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Nevertheless, he seems to have been aware (as shown
in his writings) that he could not hold consistently to this medievalist
position. He recognized that the feudal tradition of the late Middle
Ages was itself a violation of the tradition of the early Middle Ages
and that the transition had frequently been accomplished by force.
"Feudalism itself, " he said, "was very unsettled at the time of
the Norman Conquest because the gentry were interested in nothing
46
but war. Hence their support of the unfounded claims ofWilliam. "
It was only after many years that the Normans became "softened
47
into the English" and the conquerors "blended with the conquered."
He further maintained that the acceptance of this settlement over
a long period of time had produced a mild authority based on tra¬
dition and that this was far better than the harsh French revolu¬
tionary authority which required continued force to protect the
new property system.
THEORY OF SOCIAL ORDER
The social order which Burke defended was, to a large
extent, commercial, and it was increasingly becoming industrial.
The eighteenth century had seen the rise of the Bank of England,
46
Burke, "An Essay Towards An Abridgement Of Eng¬
lish History, "_Writmg£j^ VII, p. 333.
47
Burke, "Hercules Langrishe," Writings, IV, p. 272.
48
Burke, 'Reflections" Writings, III, p. 528.
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the South Sea Bubble, joint stock companies, expanding shipping
and trade, the accumulation of commercial fortunes and industrial
capital, a rash of industrial inventions, and the steady growth
of manufacturing. Commerce was the "dominant factor” in
49
eighteenth-century England, Professor Huntington states:
"For thirty years before Burke arrived in London in 1750 the
promotion of industry had been a primary objective of the Eng¬
lish government. By 1790, when, according to the aristocra¬
tic theory of conservatism, Burke was defending the feudal
corporate order, the Industrial Revolution in England was al¬
ready a generation old.
As early as 1770 Burke stated his position on this
matter quite dogmatically: "There is no such thing as the landed
interest separate from the trading interest. .,, Turn your land
into trade," Though he appears to have possessed nothing
short of scorn and disdain for financiers, the rising capitalist
class, and the Jews, he was able to recognize that landed pro-
49
See L, B. Namier, England In The Age Of The Ameri¬
can Revolution (London, 1930), pp, 15, 38, 40,
50
Cited in Samuel P. Huntington, "Conservatism As
An Ideology, " American Political Science Review, LI (June,
1957), p. 462.
51
See Biirke, "French Revolution," Works, III, p, 240,
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perty established the "firm base of every stable government."
He thereby concluded that the very wealty must be "out of all
52
proportion, predominate in the representation. "
A man with a thousand acres should not have ten times
the political voice of a man with a hundred acres, but twenty or
thirty times the authority of his poorer neighbor. This was the
case not because ability and property went together -- the reverse
was true. According to Burke:
Ability is a vigorous and active principle,
and as property is sluggish, inert and
timid, it can never be safe from the in¬
vasions of ability, unless it be, out of
all proportion, predominate in the repre¬
sentation.
Still another practical suggestion stated by Burke
was the exclusion of eighty-five percent of all adult males from
any active participation in politics. He computed that one out
of seven might have sufficient independence, education, and lei¬
sure to vote intelligently. All salaried persons without indepen¬
dent incomes would be excluded. Not that Burke would have
granted the vote to this minority as a "right," he only conceded
that extensive participation might fall within "natural limits, "
^^Ibid., p. 241.
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and thus be compatible with civilized government.
Francis Canavan, in his Political Reason Of Edmund
Burke, interprets this line of thought thusly:
The thesis.. .was directed against the natural
rights school of political thought and was in
effect a denial that the natural rights of men,
by themselves, furnished an adequate stan¬
dard for determining the rights of men in
society. Since society was 'wholly arti-
ficiail, ' said Burke, the rights of civil,
social man were a question of 'conven-
ience' and not simply of abstract truth.
The writer has not presented Burke "tout ensemble," nor
has he done him justice. As stated previously, Burke did not
leave any comprehensive, generalized works. He was a complex
and brilliant figure. To have enumerated the extent and variety
of Burke's appeals to the different facets of his thought consid¬
ered herein would have been far beyond the scope of this study.
The writer has attempted to establish the basic concepts of Burke
which have proved to be essential "rallying points" for the "New
American Conservatives."
’S4
Burke, "Conciliation," Works, II, p. 172.
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Chapter IV
ANALYSIS OF THE BASIC PHILOSOPHIES OF THREE LEADING
PROPONENTS OF "NEW CONSERVATISM" IN AMERICA
A word is not a crystal, transparent and un¬
changed; it is the skin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content
according to the circumstances and time in
which it is used.
Justice Holmes
For the first few years after World War II, the conser¬
vatives appeared to have been a quite dispirited group, convinced
more than ever that the nation had passed its peak and that, as the
federal bureaucracy swelled, all would get worse at an even faster
rate. The Truman Administration was no more liberal than the
conservatives expected it to be. Apparently what they did not ex¬
pect, or hoped would not happen, was that the Eisenhower Admin¬
istration would fail altogether to start dismantling the welfare
state. ^ This was only one of the "grande marche" of events which
prepared well the favorable reception of a conservative approach
to a "New Conservative" thought in America. Other contributing
factors, according to Philip Chapman, were: the refusal of the
^Joseph Roddy, "What Is A Liberal? What Is A Con¬
servative? " Look, XXVII (July 28, 1964), p. 21.
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Soviet Union to permit or accept an enduring peace; the disasters
of Eastern Europe; the "anti-communist” hysteria; the decline
of New and Fair Deal enthusiam; and the inability of certain in-
2
tellectuals to recognize the tyrannical nature of Stalin's Russia.
He advances his theory even further by stating:
The outbreak of war in Korea and then the
Eisenhower victory in 1952 served to in¬
tensify the belief of many that the American
mind had reached crossroads, had lost
patience with 'naive liberalism,' and that
a slow ponderous and epoch-making change
of course was in the offering. ^
The call for the conservatives of the country to unite
went out with the warning ffaat otherwise they would have nothing
left to lose before they got chained into Socialist slavery. The
response, though, slow at first, seemed sustained. Self-pro¬
fessed conservatives are now numerous, energetic, articulate
and full of conflicting accounts of what they stand for. Yet they
are loosely assembled in a restless political force camped out¬
side and within the movable walls of the GOP and hard across
the Right Wing of the Democratic Party. Contrary to the con-
2
Cited in Philip C. Chapman, "The New Conservatism"




servatives of 1789, who had doubts about giving every freeman
the franchise, the "New Conservatives," of 1965, generally share
the belief that they must give the franchised something better than a
4
choice between Republican and Democratic liberals.
In the wake of the forementioned encounters and
occurences, a small, unorganized, academic group began to
seek a "new" conservative philosophy; the names of Russell
Kirk, Peter Viereck and Willmoore Kendall immediately spring
to mind. The movement has probably been the most stimulating
element in contemporary political thought. This small vanguard
tends to concentrate the bulk of its activities on the critical re¬
jection of liberal and socialist assumptions and achievements.
We should not dare, even for a moment, to assume
that this type of "intellectual revolution" is peculiar to America.
Conservatism in the general sense of resistance to change and
reliance on habit and tradition is the socieil-psychological atti¬
tudes most typical of mankind in the whole course of history.
Only when the "cake of custom" is broken, only when a society
moves from "status to contract" do experiments, individualism,
and revolution become fashionable. In such circumstances phi¬
losophical or reflective conservatism is most likely to exist. It
4
See Roddy, op. cit., p. 20.
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has no function in a society in which men are automatically con¬
servative; nor has it any place in a system in which violence,
fear, and thought-control have displaced both tradition and the
5
optimistic experiments of liberal democracy. One writer states
the case thusly:
Phiosophical conservatism is.. .the normal
intellectual reaction to the diseases of high
political civilization; it is a conscious cor¬
rective to liberalism and democracy and their
consequences, an effort to rediscover the
foundations of rational freedom and sane au¬
thority, and an awareness that liberal general¬
izations have neglected certain facts about
man, society, and government. ®
As a means of understanding the overriding assumptions
inherent in this "intellectual revolution, " it seems necessary that
we analyze some of the basic philosophies of at least three of the
leading "New Conservatives." The publication, in 1949, of Peter
Viereck's Conservatism Revisited, which was given an enthusi¬
astic and cordial welcome on all sides, seems to have triggered
the output of a long series of articles in the academic journals,
magazines, books, and reviews about other books, written from
a similar point if view. In 1951, Russell Kirk's Randolph of
Roanoke appeared, to be followed in 1955 by The Conservative
5
See Jasper B. Shannon, "Conservatism," Annals of
the American Academy, CCCXLIV (November, 1962), p. 5.
^Ibid.
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Mind. In 1954 he came forward with a Program For Conservatives,
and later (1956) Beyond The Dreams Of Avarice. Viereck's con¬
servative ideas received further development in his Shaime And
Glory Of The Intellectuals (1953), The Unadjusted Man (1956),
and Conservatism: From John Adams To Churchill (1956).
Willmoore Kendall, a late-conier toi this school in publi¬
cations, contributed greatly to its "staying power" in 1959
with his John Locke And The Doctrine Of Majority Rule, and
The Conservative Affirmation (1964). Still another late-comer
to this school is William F. Buckley, Jr. and his Up From
Liberalism (1959), and, in co-authorship with the editors of
National Review, The Committee And Its Critics.
Peter Viereck's mind is one which dares to be chal¬
lenged and one which an analyst would best avoid. No system¬
atic political philosopher, no well-organized examiner of ide¬
ologies, Viereck is a "garden-variety" philosopher who pre¬
sents his conservative faith against a backdrop of commentary
on twentieth century man. Yet, his conservative exposition is
germane in many ways to a discussion of New Conservatism in
America.
Many familiar elements of conservative temperament
appear throughout Viereck's work, such as: the ideas of public
service, decorum, noblesse oblige, the moral restraints of tra-
49
dition, the inner grace to be able to face calamity, the need to
experience ethical restraints for long periods of history in or¬
der to make them effective, the primacy of morality over eco¬
nomics because economic ambitions are disruptive while ethical
aspirations are cohesive, a tendency to "concreteness" and the
burden on those who propose innovations. His most brief and
concise summary of the conservative faith is captivating in
its simplicity and eloquence:
The conservative principles 'par excellence'
are proportion and measure; self-expression
through reform; humanism and classical ba¬
lance; a fruitful nostalgia for the permanent
beneath the flux; and a fruitful obsession for
unbroken historic continuity. These princi¬
ples together create freedom, a freedom
built not on the quicksand of adolescent de¬
fiance but on the bedrock of ethics and law.
But, Viereck goes on to say, "there is no such thing as pure con¬
servatism" and he, from there, tends to range from admixture
with Liberalism at one pole, to influence from authoritarianism
at the other. He rejects German organismic ideologies and
Maistrean Conservatism. The continental conservative for
whom he has most respect is Metternich, whom he portrays as
a Burkean who understood that nineteenth century Europe needed
repose above all, and that only an "inner balance" could resist
Cited in Peter Viereck, Conservatism Revisited
(New York, 1949), p. 6.
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the "pull toward extremes," He also retains respect for Burke
because he, among other things, "understood the possibilities of
g
self-discipline and hence £>f freedom, "
To understand Viereck’s values fully, perhaps we
should mention the things that he omits as well as those that
he includes of the societal elements, Viereck emphasizes only
the concepts of community and the supremacy of social power.
He does not appear concerned with functional harmony, nor is
he concerned with minimizing material desires. He has some
praise for the material achievements of industrialization. But,
he specifically rejects the concept of aristocracy, "Aristocracy,"
he says, "is functionless in modern society; it is only the aris¬
tocratic spirit which is precious,
Viereck prefers to identify himself with the reform¬
ist, rather than the traditionalist side of Burke, and the late
Winston Churchill is his current model. He criticizes Burke
for choosing between contradictory traditions sometimes on the





tiquity of their roots. In fact, Viereck goes so far in preferring
the reformist spirit of "Tory democracy" that he strongly recom¬
mends cooperation with democratic socialists in Europe, aid, if
12
necessary, the adoption of segments of their program. But his
adjustment to Liberal democracy is not simply a consequence of
the need for a common front against totalitarianism or even to
the fact that transitional periods of history are "always uncom-
fortable for Conservatism. " He is prepared to admit that both
the conservative and liberal impulses are equally basic to human
14
thinking and that the debate between them is therefore endless.
He further feels that conservatism is not an ideology but a "way
15
of thinking." He even ventures so far as to state that "conser-
16
vatism is best when it serves a Liberal party." In view of
these thoughts we will not find it surprising to discover later in
this study that he is pointedly rejected by Kirk's conservatism.
"Without the liberal tradition, " he further states, "there will be
17
nothing left to conserve. "
Viereck's analysis of the social structure is especially
interesting. He not only criticizes the contemporary emphasis
^4bid., p. 28. ^^Ibid., p. 16.
^^Ibid., p. 108.
14
Peter Viereck, The Unadjusted Man (Boston, 1956),
p. 13.
^^Ibid., p. 238. ^^Ibid., p. 104. ^'^Ibid., p. 39.
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on group adjustment but says bluntly that the "current anti-ma¬
terialism also is being sold like a cellophane-wrapped commo-
dity." He dismisses talk of a restoration of Christian unity as
absurd and regressive. The "return of religion" is considered
by Viereck, "a parlor fad," Distinctions in social strata prove
to Viereck that the upper classes act, along with other "rooted"
institutions, as "the props that make men good, " Such devices
as monarchy, aristocracy, church property, constitution, and
Supreme Court comprise "society's traditional restrictions on
21
the ego ... which fit man into a stable, durable, framework. ..."
In expressing his views on civil liberties, Viereck shows
profound reverence for the necessity and sanctity of law. For him the
"general laws" must be supreme over the particular ego of any indi-
vidual or class or state." "Conservatism, " according to Viereck,
"belongs to society as a whole, for its purpose is to conserve the values
needed by society as a whole. Conservatism is betrayed when it be-
23
comes the exclusive property of a single social or economic minority."
18
Peter Viereck, The Unadjusted Man (Boston, 1956), p. 9.
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Peter Viereck, Shame And Glory Of The Intellectuals
(Boston, 1953), p. 47.
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Peter Viereck, Conservatism From John Adams To
Churchill (New York, 1956), p, 14.
1C 22_,., 23_,.,Ibid., p. 15. Ibid., p. 10, Ibid.
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Though possessing "rocklike" qualities, conservatism
also creates freedom in that it makes possible orderly change, that
is, change which does not destroy tradition. Viereck further avers
that it creates freedom by preserving the individual as opposed to
mass man. He states:
What we need, and what a humanistic, non-utili¬
tarian education will foster, is a century of the indi¬
vidual man. Such a century would no longer chainge
persons into masses but masses into persons, each
with a sense of his ethical duties to balance his ma¬
terial rights,
As a means of further emphasizing the relative importance of his
convictions Viereck draws an analogy between liberals and con¬
servatives. He states that the psychological difference between
the two is the '‘split between those who trust the 'natural good¬
ness* of man and primarily want to release it from outer re¬
straints, and those who fear its 'natural' caveman propensi-
25
ties and want to check it: with inner restraints. "
When Russell Kirk's book. The Conservative Mind
From Burke To Santayana, appeared in 1953, the revivified





flourish of articles, both pro and con the New Conservatism as
Kirk presented it, has kept the reader occupied; the debate be¬
tween Kirk and his critics, however, has thus far remained a
war of attrition. Responding to the battle cry, Kirk has pub¬
lished three more relevant books and a number of articles,
which will be noted below in defense of his position.
Noting, as many do, the distaste which conservatives
feel toward dogmatic statements of philosophy, Kirk lists six
canons which any conservative in the tradition of Edmund Burke,
Kirk says, will avow:
(1) Belief that a divine intent rules society as well
as conscience, forging an eternal chain of right
and duty which links great and obscure, living
and dead. A narrow rationality ... cannot of it¬
self satisfy human needs, ... Politics is the art
of apprehending and applying Justice which is
above nature.
(2) Affection for the proliferating variety and mys¬
tery of traditional life, as distinguished from the
narrowing uniformity and equalitarianism and
utilitarian aims of most radical systems, ,..
(3) Conviction that civilized society requires orders
and classes. The only true equality is moral
equality; all other attempts at levelling lead to
despair, if enforced by positive legislation. So¬
ciety longs for leadership, and if a people destroy
natural distinctions among men, presently Buona¬
parte fills the vacuum.
(4) Persuasion that property and freedom are insep¬
arably connected, and that economic levelling is
not economic progress. Separate property from
private possession, and liberty is erased.
(5) Faith in prescription and distrust of sophisters
and calculators. Man must put control upon his
55
will and his appetite, for conservatives know man
to be governed more by emotion than by reason.
(6) Recognition that change and reform are not identi-
calp and that innovation is a devouring conflagration
more often than it is a torch of progress. Society
must alter, for slow change is the means of its
conservation;... but Providence is the proper
instrument for change....
Kirk admits that "deviations from this system of ideas have occurred,
and there are nximerous appendages to it; but in general conservatives
have adhered to these articles of belief with a consistency rare in
27
political history. ”
In stating his views on the New Conservative and change
Kirk avers, "The intelligent conservative does not set his face
against all reform. Prudent social change is the means for re¬
newing a society's vitsility, much as the human body is perpet¬
ually renewing itself, and yet retains its identity. Without ju-
dicious change, we perish. " "But, ” he further states, "change
itself cannot be the end of existence; without permanence, we
perish. Burke's standard of statesmanship was the union in
29
one man of a disposition to preserve and an ability to reform. "
In his attempt to give a more precise statement of what
the conservative wants to conserve he states:
26
Russell Kirk, The Conservative Mind From Burke
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First of all, he wants to keep humanity human. ...
Second, the conservative seeks to protect the elab¬
orate, civil social edifice which, under Providence,
has developed in America — our government of laws
and not of men, our economy characterized by volition
rather than compulsion, our institutions calculated to
make a man his own master, our political system
which prefers variety to centralized uniformity. .,,
Third, the conservative seeks to protect that
heritage of civilization which the painful labor of num¬
berless generations of men has bequeated to us, and
which is now menaced by fanaticism and the craze for
the new.
"Freedom is increasingly endangered: the freedom of the
few, and also, in the long run, the freedom of the many, '* ac-
30
cording to Kirk. He further expounds the proposition that
"we shall be unable to maintain any successful defense of our
freedoms tmtil we recognize once more those principles of order
under which freedom in our tradition -- the body of rights and pri¬
vileges acquired gradually through many centuries of English and
American social experience — acquired real meaning.
Kirk gives to us a metaphysically oriented definition of
order. "Order, " he defines as, "the realization of a body of tran¬








pose to existence and motive to conduct. " He later defines it more
explicitly as "the harmonious arrangement of classes and functions
which guards justice and gives willing consent to law and insures
that we all shall be safe together. "32
Moral order, according to Kirk's philosophy, serves as
the primary element of any coherent and beneficial freedom. It
must accord with principles, religious in origin, that establish a
hierarchy of values and set bounds to the ego. The "check of so¬
cial order" serves as the second basic ingredient of Kirk’s co¬
herent and beneficent freedom. It must accord with a rule of law,
regular in its operation, that recognizes and enforces prescrip¬
tive rights, protects minorities against majorities and majorities
against minorities, aind gives some meaning to the idea of human
dignity. Kirk also emphasizes that "freedom, as realized in the
prescriptive, separate, limited, balanced, well-defined rights
of persons and groups, operating within a state governed by mo¬
ral principles, is the quality which makes it possible for men to
become truly human.
Having considered two New Conservatives' views which
might be conceived of as representative of the two extremes of
this "movement" let us now turn our attention to a "member" who
^^ibid. 33ibid., p. 170
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might be considered an occupant of the "middle-of-the-road"
in his views -- Willmoore Kendall. In his opening pages of
The Conservative Affirmation, Kendall gives a basic summary of
his conservative views. He writes that he has "no axe to grind
for 'aristocracy,' no quarrel (any more than had the authors of
the Federalist) with America's commitment to 'democracy,' no
flirtation with the idea that the way to have a government of laws
is to somehow get men out of the picture." He further asserts
that he "views the pre-1789 John Adams with suspicion not reve¬
rence, shies off vast reaches of the argument of Burke's Reflec¬
tions on the Revolution in France, and deplores the pre-Federa-
list writings of even Alexander Hamilton." With Madison and
Hamilton, ajid with the subsequent American political-tradition
as a whole, he expounds the conviction that the United States,
"because of the qualities of its people, must and should be
36
governed by the 'deliberate sense of the community.'"
In answer to the question: "What is Conservatism?" he
states, "Conservatism is... first and foremost the resistance
to that Liberal revolution." He further clarifies this answer by
34
Willmoore Kendall, The Conservative Affirmation
(Chicago, 1963), p. ix.
35 36
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stating to the Liberal, "This advance on your part we intend to
reverse; here on the line we intend not merely to resist but to
37
drive you back. ” At first glance this definition leads us to
believe that Kendall is a hard-core, staunch conservative --
possibly a radical. He attempts to further clarify his position
by amplifying his view in the following manner:
Conservatism distinguishes between 'change' di¬
rected at the development and perfection of our
heritage as that which it is, and 'change' calculated
to transform that heritage into that which it is not;
and far from opposing the former, stands forth as
its champion.... Conservatism opposes not 'change*
but 'change* in certain directions that it condemns
on grounds of inherited principle -- inherited principle,
however, which it values not merely or even primar¬
ily because it is inherited, but because it is the product
of rational deliberation moving from sound political
and moral premises.
Kendall disassociates himself from the more dissident
elements of the "New Conservative" movement by accepting
change which has been subjected to "rational deliberation. "
He refuses to subscribe to the belief that an hereditary element is
virtuous simply because it "was good for them." In so doing he
represents the sense of moderation in the "New Conservative"
movement.
37 38
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In so stating he makes it crystal clear that his idea of con¬
servatism maintains a certain degree of flexibility. This flexibility,
however, does not lend itself to be stretched out of proportion or to
an unidentifiable extreme form. Our original heritage should be recog¬
nizable throughout the transformation administered it by "heretics" and
its fundamental moral and political qualities should outshine all others in
the final product.
In describing his concept of tradition KendaU writes:
We must assume .that we most accurately
identify the tradition ... by seeking out those notions
of good and evil that survive through all the changes,
so that we are nearest to the core of the tradition
when we touch upon those beliefs and commitments
and notions of good and evil that a) have perdued in
recognizable form over the longest period of time,
and b) have proved themselves genuine by being con¬
sistently acted upon and at the margin, fought for.
Fought for ... against enemies beyond the gates of our
Civilization, whom by a long tradition and with strict
accuracy,we call barbarians, and now against enemies
within the gates, whom by a long tradition we call
heretics.
Here again Kendall amplifies the elasticity of his brand of
conservatism. Those qualities in our tradition which have exempli¬
fied the greatest degree of perseverance and steadfastness should
serve as the foimdation of our tradition. He candidly refers to the
39
Willmoore Kendall and Mulford Q. Sibley, War & The
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(Denver, 1959), p. 7.
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adversaries of our tradition as "heretics." The heretic, according to
Kendall, " is the man insufficiently civilized to understand.. .the com¬
plex of propositions that make up orthodox Christianity. In describing
the heretic further he writes:
He is not ... an unbeliever. The heretic believes,
but believes only a portion of the Deposit of Faith;
and he believes this portion to the exclusion of that
because he is temperamentally or intellectually in¬
capable of getting hold of that fusion of op|)psites
that is the fulness of the Christian Faith.
In a debate at Stanford University Willmoore Kendall pre¬
sented the basis of his concept of the preservation of the state in the
following manner:
A state which will not wage war in any circum¬
stances, however serious, would condemn it¬
self ... to extinction. Now: if the natural law
demanded that, then God, who is the Author of
the natural law, would both will and not will po¬
litical society. He would will its end, and at
the same time forbid it the means necessary
for attaining that end, and we say 'necessary'
because the state that cannot protect the life,
liberty, and property of its citizens fails in its
appointed function.
The state which finds itself totally engulfed in a realm of con¬
tentedness and passivity without the means nor the desire to attain the
^^Ibid., p. 8. '^^Ibid.
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means necessary to preserve its status quo is a doomed nation. Kendall,
in the tradition of many advocates of the "New Conservatism,” finds refuge
for his theory of the preservation of the state in ”the laws of Nature and
of Nature's God.” The protection of the free energies of free individuals,
so that they might, in liberty, strive to live according to those laws, is of in'
timate concern to him. He doesn't fail to realize that in the defense of
liberty a properly constituted state is necessary not only to "establish
Justice and insure domestic Tranquility” but also to "provide for the com¬
mon Defense. ”
In the area of civil rights Kendall seems to take a liberal stand
in that he suggesj^s that we should iron out inequalities of representation
in Congress, since these, theoretically at least, are capable of substituting
43
the will of a minority for that of the majority. He furthea: suggests that
we assure equal representation and thus genuine majority mandates, by
enacting ever stronger "civil rights” legislation calculated to prevent
the white southerners from disfranchising or intimidating potential Negro
voters, and by putting the Department of Justice permanently into the busi-
44
ness of enforcing the strengthened civil rights. As a means of further
clarification of this stand he resorts to the words of Jean Jacques Rousseau
in stating: "Man .., was .., born 'free,' and without law; he can be bound
43





only by his own consent; and since today we find him 'bound' by society
and law,, his bondage is either wrongful, because it is not based on his
consent or it is based upon agreement and contract. .,, Agreement, then
45
is the sole creator of society, of justice, or right, and wrong. ..." In
adding the religious element, which is highly indicative of the "New Con¬
servative" mind, Kendall refers to the teaching of St, Thomas Aquinas:
Even if I knew infallibly, even if I knew by a Reve¬
lation of God that my efforts to save my father's
death, it would not affect my obligation to try to keep
him alive. In a word: God's will for me would remain
what it was before the Revelation, namely, that I live
up to my obligations. God may have willed the destruc¬
tion of the planet in an atomic Gotterdammerung (I do
not know, of course, and can never know); but 'we'
are involved, to fulfill our duties in all their concrete¬
ness eind detail. That preserving ... is God's will
for us. ...
Herein has been presented the basic philosophies of three of
the leading proponents of the New Conservatism, We have seen that
this new school covers a vast admixture of considerations in the areas
to which we have limited ourselves in this study, Kirk, and Kendall to
a certain degree, have attempted to present relatively concise summaries
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has exhibited much concern for a restatement of conservative prin¬
ciples. This examination of conservative principles has revealed
that contemporary conservatives are concerned with proper notions
of human nature, religion, the pastiiichange, property, civil liberties,
and the ills and challenges which beset modern American society.
The following chapter will, therefore, proceed from an exposition of
these principles to a critique of the dissension which appears in the
three aforementioned "New Conservatives."
Chapter V
BASIC AREAS OF DISSENSION AND AGREEMENT WITHIN
THE "NEW CONSERVATIVE” ORDER
History shows us that human beings are endowed with a
teleological tendency towards inevitable change under the impact of
altered circumstances. ^ Conservatives, by no means, prove to be
exceptions. Even the image of liberalism has been transformed
beyond recognition during the last century. In view of this, there
should be no cause for surprise or dismay if conservatism in the
present age has shifted ideological ground and taken on some fea¬
tures of nineteenth century liberalism thereby creating a degree of
dissension within its ranks.
Conservatives disagree. They sometimes disagree not
only on specific issues but on seemingly basic principles. As
James Burnham writes in his Congress And The American Tradition,
"Some hold, for example, that conservatism is based ultimately on
an individualistic philosophy; others, that it rests on an 'organic'
view of society; still others that its roots are theological. ”2 Mr.
Burnham goes even further by listing thirteen different attitudes
^A classical example of this can be seen in the actions
of Southern politics and politicians.
2cited in James Burnham, Congress And The American
Tradition (New York, 1959), p. 27.
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which distinguish conservatives from liberals; but even here, at
the level of day-by-day action, he will commit himself only so
far as to say that these attitudes are "elements or symptoms
3
that often (though not always) occur together, "
While conservatives go about the task of establishing
and exploring the meaning of their community, it is good for
them to keep Mr, Burnham's cautionary observation in mind.
Conservatives do not always agree with each other. Judging from
the analysis presented in the last chapter this seems quite
obvious, and it would not be mentioned here were it not for the
fact that ever so often, in various journals of opinion, especially
conservative journals, certain conservatives have found it neces¬
sary, as a result of finding themselves unable to concur with what
a fellow conservative has written, to present conflicting opinions
which are far afield, almost to the extreme, to that of his fellow
colleague.
One of the lines of demarcation finds itself marked in
devout divergence concerning their models or ideological ances¬
tors, In the interest of space and cohesiveness the author will not
attempt a comprehensive coverage of these ancestors, as that ad¬
ministered Edmxmd Burke in chapter three, but rather mention them
in passing as a means of illustrating a point, Viereck, who rather pass-
^Ibid., ch. II,
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ively assumes the role of a deviate along these lines, predominantly
finds himself idolizing the writings and actions of Metternich. Even
though he considers Metternich "a Burkean" he sternly criticizes
Burke for "choosing between contradictory traditions sometimes
on the basis of natural rights and sometimes simply because of
their age. In spite of this criticism he is inclined to identify
himself with the reformist side of Burke. As a matter of fact,
Viereck goes so far in preferring the reformist spirit of "Tory
democracy" that he strongly recommends cooperation with dem¬
ocratic socialists in Europe, and, if necessary, the adoption of
segments of their program.
The "New Conservatives" in America exert a great
amount of appeal to tradition and order in their various philos¬
ophies. Needless to say, this marks another line of demarca¬
tion among their ranks. This line is evidenced, however, through
their degrees of emphasis. Russell Kirk, in his A Program For
Conservatives, states his case in the following manner:
I do not want our traditions to run out,
because I do not believe that formal indoc¬
trination, or pure rationality, or simple
imitation of our contemporaries, can re¬
place traditions. Traditions are the wis¬
dom of the race; they are the only sure in¬
struments of moral instruction; and they
teach us the solemn veneration of the eter¬
nal contract which cannot be imported by
Peter Viereck, Conservatism Revisited (New York,
1949), p. 137.
68
pure reason, ... A people who have lost their traditions
are starved for imagination and devoid of any general as-
aiunptions to give coherence to their life. ^
Through the use of his religious overtones, for which he
is so well known, Kirk seemingly relates them to the writings
of Burke as a means of further illustrating his profound reve-
ranee for traditions:
Society is indeed a contract ... but not a contract
in any mere historical or commercial sense. It
is a partnership between those who are living, those
who are dead, and those who yet to be born. It
is a contract, too, between God and man, linking
the lower with the higher natures, connecting the
visible and invisible worlds, according to a fixed
compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds
all physical and all moral natures, each in their ap¬
pointed places.®
In his attempt to expound upon man’s "knowability” of the
contents of this contract he resorts to the "age-old" escape mec¬
hanism of insisting that it is "commonly ... inscrutable" and in¬
accessible to reason.
Before casting his dissenting vote Viereck makes an
attempt to define tradition. He defines it as "all the lessons of
the past, but only the ethically acceptable events," He then
casts his dissent by stating: "Not all the past is worth keeping. ...
5
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Though the events of the past are often shameful and bloody, its
lessons are indispensable." In that the reactionary means "all
the events" of the past in his traditional scheme, rather that the
"ethically acceptable" ones, according to Viereck, "he misses
all the lessons, " The use of the term "reactionary" by
Viereck seems to step squarely on the toes of Kirk, In all
of his modesty and geniality, Viereck is emphatic in accep¬
ting the proposition that American traditions are liberal but
still insists that it is the function of conservatives to pre-
servie those traditions. Even more, he accepts the reforms
of the New Deal not only as inevitable but as positively de-
9
sirable when evaluated by conservative standards.
It may be granted that tradition is a habitual pat¬
tern of thinking and acting, and in part is a "fact" of social
life. But when habit is elevated as a guide to action and is
given the obligatory quality of an "ought" the "fact" is trans¬
formed into a norm and becomes traditionalism. Thus, the
legitimacy of a social order may be based on tradition. But,
as Max Weber observed, there is absolutely nothing normative
8
Viereck, op, cit., p. 5,
^Ibid.
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about habit as such, "It is either a mechanism or a concrete
„10
pattern of actual behavior, not a way men should act.
By transforming a fact into a value, "traditionalism"
tends to lead to confusion through the creation, in many instances,
of circular reasoning. Thus, if the conservative is asked, "Why
should tradition be obeyed?" his answer is likely to be, "Be¬
cause obedience to tradition is the condition of a well-ordered
society." Upon being pursued even further with the question,
"What is a well-ordered society?" the conservative would pro¬
bably reply, "One in which tradition is obeyed. "
This normative theory has even been applied to the
historical realm. Kendall states it this way:
.. ,We must seek out those notions of good and
evil that survive through all the changes, so
that we are nearest to the core of the tradition
when we touch upon those beliefs .., that have
a) perdued in recognizable form over the lon¬
gest period of time, and b) have proved them¬
selves genuine by being acted upon consistently.
To find the answer to political, social, and economic problems
from an examination of history is actually to go to a realm of
ethics, perhaps to a concealed crypto-ethic. To apply history
as a norm and to demand that individuals regard themselves as
bound by history brings history itself:to a standstill.
^^Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action
(New York, 1937), p. 646.
^^Willmoore Kendall, The Conservative Affirmation
(Chicago, 1963), p. 223,
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Still another line of demarcation exists within the "New
Conservative" ranks. This line is made evident by differences of
opinion on the issue of civil liberties. In writing upon this aspect
of the New Conservative "ideology, " if it might be re|erred to as
such, Viereck proceeds very cautiously in that he bifurcates the
term into two different areas. He writes:
The two primary types of equality should
not be confused, the first legal and objective,
the second psychological and subjective. In
the definable, tangible, explicit sphere of
legal rights, equality is possible in a country
like America and also desirable; inequality in
that sphere weakens liberty by making it seem
hypocritical. But in the indefinable, intangible,
implicit sphere of cultural and social status,
equality is impossible; it involves too many
insatiable, semiconscious cravings of pride.
In an attempt to futher clarify this statement, Viereck
cites illustrations of the American education system.
Two current trends in American education
illustrates at its worst and at its best the
second equality. At its worst: equally en¬
couraging the qualified and unqualified to
proceed to college and thereby to destroy
the educational standards needed for sur¬
vival. At its best: removing racial segregation in
12
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schools, thereby reducing psychological bruises
that would otherwise discredit as hypocritical
the first (legal) equality of the Fourteenth Am¬
endment.
Russell Kirk analyzes this proposition from the stand¬
point of "social justice." Being the religiously inspired individual
that his writings portray him as being it seems only logical that
his ideas, on this subject, would possess spiritual overtones. He,
too, has a two-fold "communicative" justice and "distributive"
14
justice. In defining these two concepts he resorts to the words
of Jeremy Taylor, who wrote some 300 years ago. He defined
the former as "that justice which supposes exchange of things
profitable for things profitable" and the latter as "that arrange¬
ment in society by which each man obtains what his nature and
15
his labor entitle him to, without oppression or evasion."
Having viewed these, among other, lines of divergence
one might be led to conclude that all is lost for the New Conserva¬
tive cause. This happens not to be the case. It is for New Conser¬
vatism to profit from its disagreement if it is frankly admitted and
honestly debated. They may also profit by heeding ithe following
words of advice which appeared in an editorial in Modern Age:
^^Ibid., p. 44.
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... A position worth holding is worth arguing;
a position that cannot withstand criticism is
not worth holding. Two men who reach simi¬
lar conclusions on the basis of seemingly op¬
posed philosophies may well discover through
the examination of each other's point of view
that their philosophies have unsuspected kinship.
Two men who advance opposing programs
on the basis of the same philosophical
assumptions have grounds for hoping that
discussion will reveal faulty reasoning on the
part of one or both -- or, better yet, find out
that their common philosophic approach im¬
plies a broader program embodying values
that were only seemingly in conflict. We
need not fear debate among ourselves.
Despite certain divergences, many New Conservatives
hold in common various mutual attitudes and underlying princi¬
ples -- not only among themselves, but also with the men and
women in every walk of life who make up the rapidly growing
"New Conservative" movement. These basic agreements are demo-
strated again and again in spite of the particular and often
rather opposed theses of conservative writers.
Conservatives, almost without exception, recognize
the transcendent goal of human existence and the primacy of the
freedom of the person in the state. While there is great diver¬
gence among conservatives as to the degree to which the state
must be limited, they basically share a distaste for the use of the
15 "These and Other Issues,
" Modern Age, Summer,
1960, p. 35.
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power of the state to enforce "ideal" patterns upon human beings.
The mythological outlook which recognizes men as faceless units
to be organized and directed in accordance with the blueprints
of the social engineer, can be held only when men ignore the sep¬
arate integrity of each human being as a focus of value and the'
existence of immutable moral laws not susceptible to ideological
16
conservative structures. Frank Meyer, a devout conserva¬
tive, has this to say as a means of conservative agreement on
this point:
Whether the concentration of conservatives is
on the importance of the free-enterprise economic
system and the strict limitation of the state as gua¬
rantee of the freedom of persons from the plans of
the social engineer, or on the living multiplicity of
theiteommunity arising from the rich tradition of a
civilization, the libertarian and the traditionalist
emphases within conservatism alike reject the cen¬
tralized power and direction necessary to the plan¬
ning of society.
That fused position maintains that the only possible
ultimate vindication of the freedom of the individual person rests
upon a belief in his overriding value as a person, a value based
upon transcendent considerations. And, it further maintains that
the duty of men is to seek virtue; but it insists that men cannot
16





do so, in actuality, unless they are free from the constraint
of the physical coercion of an unlimited state. This point is
further illustrated in the following quotation found in National
Review:
... the simialacrum of virtuous acts brought
about by the coercion of superior power, is
not virtue, the meaning of which resj^es
in the free choice of good over evil.
The New Conservatives stand in agreement for a division of power,
in order that those who hold it may balance each other and the con¬
centration of overweening power be foreclosed. They stand for
the limitation of the power of the state, division of power within
the state, a free economy, and prescriptive protection of the
rights of individual persons and groups of individual persons aga¬
inst the state. They do not visualize the state as an absolute evil;
rather it is regarded as a necessary institution. In other words,
the state is not regarded as an evil instrument so long as the force
it wills is effectively limited by a constitutional understanding of
the bounds within which that force may not intrude upon the sacred
sphere of the individual person, and so long as that understanding
19
is enforced by division and balance of powers.
18
19
"This And Other Issues,
Ibid.
ft
op. cit., p. 29.
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The spirit of the Constitution of the United States as
originally conceived permeates the writings of the *'New Con¬
servatives: the limitation of government to its proper functions;
within government, tension and balance between local and cen¬
tral power; within the Federal government, tension and balance
between the coordinate branches. Irrespective of whether theite
emphasis is upon tradition and order or upon liberty. New Con¬
servatives generally agree in their veneration of the ordered
liberty conceived and executed by the Framers of the Constitution.
As a final measure the author will briefly consider the
renewed emphasis upon religion for which the "New Conserva¬
tives, " in large measure, are calling. However varied their
religious commitments, the "New Conservatives," for the most
part, accept the existence of an objective moral order based on
what Eric Voegelin has called "the constitution of being" -- that
is, the existence of immutable standards by which human conduct
should be judged. Hallowell asserts that "just as liberty is a
function of subordination, so character is a function of religious
21
conviction. " Francis Wilson puts it this way:
20
Eric Voegelin, Order And History (j_iOuisiana, 1956),
p. 8.
21
John H. Hallowell, The Moral Foundations Of Democracy (New
York, 1957), pp. 109-13.
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A government which encourages the secularism
of private life by public example is a criminal
accessory. Such considerations lead not to re¬
ligious exhortation but to an attack upon the pub¬
lic schools Sind upon government for too rigidly
adhering to the separation of church and state.
For the most part the New Conservatives maintain that government
support of religion is necessary in our age, and that such support
is entirely in accord with constitutional law so long as it is
nondiscriminatory.
22Francis G. Wilson, "The Anatomy of Conservatives,




Far from being an outmoded philosophy of the past
conservatism is most applicable to many of the most vital issues
of the present. Conservatism at all times and in all countries
has stood for religion, patriotism, the integrity of the family
and respect for private property as the four pillars of a sound
and healthy society. Add to this its tradition of guarding against
the excesses of the revolutionary dictator and the follies of
dogmatic general ideas, its realistic view of the nature of man
and its libertarian significance in this age of grasping centra¬
lized state power -- and one finds in conservatism a creed which
should appeal to many who are distressed by some of the weak¬
nesses that have developed in democracies in an era of indus¬
trialism and mass communication. ^
W^hile the emphasis of conservatism may shift from
one country and one era, such as that presented to England in
the eighteenth century and the present form being witnessed in
America today, there are certain intellectual traits which make
^William Henry Chamberlain, "Conservatism In Evo¬
lution, " Modern Age, VII (Summer, 1963), p, 73.
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conservatism not a passing form of political and social organization,
but a permanent outlook on life. No reasonable New Conservative
denies the need for change and reform in a viable, on-going society.
But the New Conservative will oppose change for the sake of change.
He will , in other words, agree with Lord Falkland, the middle-
of-the-road man in England's struggle between King and Par¬
liament, who pronounced the maixim: "When it is not necessary
n2
to change, it is necessary not to change.
i The New Conservative places more trust in the inherited
experience of the human race than in the operations of an individual
doctrinaire intellect, however brilliant. He views human so¬
ciety, in Burke's words, as "a compact between the living, the
dead, and those yet to be born" as a chain of continuity which can
only be disrupted at a terrible cost in human values, and for
3
achievements of very doubtful value. Even though the New
Conservative might appear to be such to the beginning reader
of the conservative philosophy, he is not a nihilist who desires to
make a clean sweep of existing institutions and start constructing
a brand new order with a sketch on a tabla rasa.
2
Stated In Arthur Bryant, The Spirit Of Conservatism
(London, 1955), p. 173.
^Burke, "Appeal From The New To The Old Whigs, "
Works, IV, p. 76.
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The New Conservative takes a seemingly less optimistic
view of human nature than the "liberal" or the "revolutionary."
He is instinctively bored of triteful refined phrases which tend to
shield or conceal basic realities. He persostently looks behind
the label of such expressions as "social justice," "economic
democracy, " and "century of the common man, " and ask just
what these expressions are supposed to convey and how they are
to be implemented.
The New Conservatives are criticizing a predominantly
"liberal" order, and their criticisms of it are of a fundamental
nature. Philip Chapman phrases it in this manner:
Their objections — to its materialism and secu¬
larism, to the pervasive influence of mass op¬
inion, to its equalitarianism and conformism,
and to its degradation of older religious, aes¬
thetic and cultural values, by reproduction and
adulteration -- constitute a rejection of many of
its most characteristic features. A radical or
a thoroughgoing reactionary is perfectly at home
in such a situation: he spins out a society and,
if the conditions are right, makes preparations
to bring it into being. ^
It is important that one understands the relation of the
New Conservatives to the society that they are criticizing, on the
one hand, and to the aristocratic tradition to which they appeal,
on the other. First, it should be emphasized that they are them-
^Philip C. Chapman, "The New Conservatism," Political
Science Quarterly, LXXV (March, 1960), p. 18.
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selves members of this society. They are not the products of
a traditional resistance to mass power. Since the early decades
of the nineteenth century, America has had no politically func¬
tioning class or interest which has identified itseld with the
task of restraining the growth of the political power of the demo¬
cratic masses, "The conservative criticism of mass values, "
Chapman further postulates, "is not a traditional function, but
5
a spontaneous and contemporary development,"
The New Conservatives have made a very serious at¬
tempt to compare the form of civilization that has developed in
America with that of Britain and Europe, and to judge the former
by the latter. This effort has proved lacking in certain aspects
in that it has involved an appeal to a tradition which is sim-
0
ply not there. The problems of this country and this culture
do not possess any intimate or organic connections with those
of Europe, The thoughts of Burke, Maistre, Metternich and
the rest were read enough responses to stresses which arose
there, and as such they remain instructive enough for anyone
interested in the rich European past. But then to try making
^Ibid.
6
For a detailed analysis of this postulation see Louis
Hartz, The Liberal Tradition In America (New York, 1955), p,
17; also see Eric L„ McKitrick, "Conservatism Today, " The
American Scholar, XXVII (Winter, 1957-58), 52.
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parallels with America's experience is really straining the connec¬
tion too far, especially when it comes to placing men like Alexander
Hamilton, John Randolph, John Calhoun, and John Adams in the same
tradition, one in which they have very little business, if any at all.
Historians generally accept the proposition that histori-
7
cally our society at large has not been a conservative one at all;
if anything, it has been "liberal, " and its principle feature has been
the very dynamic and unconservative quality of ever-expanding cap¬
italism. Even the concern of our politics and politicians (and this
includes Alexander Hamilton) typicailly has been not that of slowing
down the speeding process but rather of adding coal to the fire.
The watchword may be "tradition, " but it is quite
a drawback if we are never certain as to whose traditions are
being invoked. If he so desires, the present-day American may
declare himself a conservative, as he is urged to do by Kirk and
others. But one hesitates to accept that kind of explicitness. An
impelling question which seemingly should be answered by the pro¬
ponents of the "New Conservative" doctrine, as a means of locating its
sustaining force, may be stated thusly: "it is to be found in
7
See Leonard W, Labaree, Conservatism In Early Ameri¬
can History (New York, 1948); Clinton Rossiter, Seedtime Of The
Republic (New York, 1953); and W. Hardy Wickwar, ^'Foundations
Of American Conservatism, " American Political Science Review,
XLI (Jtme, 1947).
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philosophical principles imported from Europe, or in a ser of
emerging perceptions about the nature and workings of American
society?”
America is different, both in history and present state,
and the full conservative tradition simply wijjtnot flourish on this
soil. We shall continue to harbor conservatives, and they will
continue to serve us. We shall continue to study Burke and learn
from him about the follies and cruelties of Jacobin democracy.
It would, however, be the greatest of follies and crudest of delu¬
sions to shape the philosophy of American conservatism in the full
image of English or European conservatism, which even today has
made no stable peace with industrial capitalism or liberal democracy.
We are not ready in this "new” country for "old-country” conser¬
vatism. If we are lucisy, we may never be.
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